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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal was proper before the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3 (2) (H) (1996). However, the Utah 
Supreme Court entered it=s Order of June 9, 2004, and transferred this matter to the 
Utah Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (4), Utah Code Ann. 
(ROA p. 225). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues on Appeal 
Issue One: The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment based on 
City Market's argument that under current Utah premise liability law, a business 
owner has no duty to its business invitees when the invitees are outside the four walls 
of the building leased by the business owner. 
Issue Two: The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment while 
discovery was ongoing and numerous facts were disputed which were directly related 
to the theories of recovery. Additionally, the trial court reversed the burden of proof 
with respect to those disputed facts when they are being considered as part of a 
summary judgment motion. 
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Standard of Review 
On May 13, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court reversed Judge Halliday in Smith v. 
Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 70 R3d 904, 2003 UT 23 (Utah 
05/13/2003) and provided a detailed standard of review to be applied by an appellate 
court when it is reviewing a grant of summary judgment: 
On an appeal of a district court's entry of summary judgment, the 
appellate court applies the same standard as applied by the district 
court. City Consumer Serv. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 239 (Utah 1991); 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332,1334 (Utah 1977). According to 
that standard, summary judgment is only appropriate where "there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
"When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, 
we (appellate court) examine the court's legal conclusions for 
correctness/" Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 64, f 10, 52 
P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 84, If 13, 34 P.3d 
755). "If, after a review of the record, it appears that there is a material 
factual issue, we are compelled to reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment." W. Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 378 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
For a moving party to be entitled to summary judgment, it must 
establish a right to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to 
the undisputed facts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Transamerica Cash 
Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24,25 (Utah 
1990). We have noted that summary judgment "should be granted 
only when all the facts entitling the moving party to a judgment are 
clearly established or admitted." Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458, 460 
(Utah 1978). For summary judgment to be appropriate, these 
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undisputed facts provided by the moving party must "preclude, as a 
matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the losing party." FMA 
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332,1334 (Utah 
1979); see also Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1990) 
("[T]here must exist undisputed facts in the evidence before the trial 
court relating to each of the elements of the legal doctrine upon 
which the trial court rests its decision to grant summary judgment in 
order for us to affirm the ruling."). 
Once the moving party has presented sufficient evidence to support 
the claim for judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the 
non-moving party to provide evidence creating an issue of material 
fact. According to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, "[a]ll 
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement." Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. 4-501 (2)(B). "A party opposing the motion is required only to 
show that there is a material issue of fact. Affidavits and depositions 
submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment may be used only to determine whether a material issue of 
fact exists." Lamb v. B&B;Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 
(Utah 1993). Therefore, "when the moving party has presented 
evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the 
opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is 
justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present or 
would be at trial." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 269, 
351 P.2d 624, 636-37 (I960)). The existence of even one question of 
fact precludes us from granting summary judgment on these 
alternative arguments. 
Quoting Smith,f 13,f24,f 53. 
[Note: Rule 4-501 has been subsequently repealed.] 
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Preservation of Issues 
Both issues were preserved in Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant City Market's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the Memorandum offered in support there of 
(ROA p. 170), including the Affidavit of the Price City officer Penovich and the Price 
City documents attached thereto (ROA p. 179-185; Addenda E); and during oral 
argument, a transcript of which is a part of the Record on Appeal (ROA p. 230). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
While not necessarily determinative of the issues, the following Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Utah Statutes and Price City Ordinances are cited in this brief and are 
included in their entirety in the Addendum: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Addenda A 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Findings by the Court, Addenda A 
Applicable Ordinances: 
Price City, Utah, Ordinance #. 6-4-J and L, Addenda B 
Price City, Utah, Ordinance #6.4.13, Addenda B 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
Plaintiff/Appellant originally filed her complaint and asserted claims of 
negligence against the Utah State Retirement Office; Barlow Nielsen Associates, Inc.; 
City Market, Inc. and unnamed John Does. Defendant Utah State Retirement Office 
was dismissed without objection. Neither Defendant City Market or Barlow Nielsen 
filed cross-claims against Defendant Utah State Retirement Office although each 
alleged a contractual relationship under lease/management agreements with said 
defendant and neither is barred from enforcing their contractual rights by the Utah 
Governmental Immunities Act (Transcript of Oral Argument p. 12 line 3). (See 
Section 63-30d-301, UCA, Addenda C) . 
No lease agreements or other contracts have ever been placed into evidence by 
any of the defendants and the rights and responsibilities of the defendants under the 
alleged contracts were merely asserted by Defendant City Market in a summary 
judgment motion consisting of seven pages and unsupported by sworn affidavit or 
evidence of any kind (ROA p. 152).. 
Plaintiff/Appellant asserted claims of negligence against Defendant City 
Market, Inc. contending that said Defendant knew or should have known of the 
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clearly observable and dangerous condition directly adjacent to and with 12 feet of its 
only public business entrance and that, even if they did not control or create it, they 
had a duty to warn their invitees of its presence. Additionally, Plaintiff/Appellant 
alleged and proffered evidence from the Price City records that said defendant has 
consistently represented having had actual control over the exact area where the 
dangerous condition existed in its business license applications to Price City. 
Plaintiff/Appellant additionally alleged that Defendant Barlow Nielsen 
Associates, Inc., is the party responsible for the negligent repair and/or construction 
which created the hazard and injured the Plaintiff/Appellant. The claims against 
Defendant Barlow Nielsen Associates, Inc. are still pending before the Court. 
The current order under appeal dismissed Defendant City Market, Inc. with 
prejudice, and certified the judgment as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54 (b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (Addenda G; ROA p. 213). 
Disposition in the Trial Court 
This is an interlocutory appeal taken from an order of the Carbon County 
Seventh District Court which granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant City 
Market, Inc. and dismissed all claims against said Defendant with prejudice on May 3, 
2004. This appeal involves a multiple-party, multiple-claim case and the judgment has 
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been certified as a final judgment by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54 (b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff/Appellant's claims against Defendant Barlow 
Neilson are still pending in the trial court. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Defendant City Market does not own the building in which it conducts 
business or the common area that surrounds same. City Market asserts that it leases 
the building but denies any responsibility for the common areas of the shopping 
center where its market is located. (ROAp. 156). 
2. City Market has never proffered its lease into evidence. As of the date of the 
motion for summary judgment, the trial court had no sworn affidavits or evidence of 
any kind to support the assertions made by City Market concerning its rights and 
responsibilities, or lack thereof, in the common areas although disputes concerning 
the validity of those assertions were raised by Plaintiff and supported by a sworn 
affidavit from the Price City offices and city documents. (Aff. of Penovich, Addenda 
E; ROAp. 179-185). 
3. In 1980, City Market applied for a Price City business license and tendered a 
site plan designating itself as the tenant of the building and the surrounding common 
area, inclusive of the parking lot and fire lane adjacent to the store. Pursuant to Price 
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City Ordinance No. 6-4-J and L, now 6.4.13 (Addenda B; ROA p. 183-184), no 
business license can be issued unless a business has sufficient parking stalls and fire 
lanes designated for its customers on its site plan. At all times since the issuance of 
City Market's original business license, said business has represented to Price City that 
the parking area and the fire lane are part of its designated common area and City 
Market has has utilized same for the benefit of its business operations. (Aff. of 
Penovich from Price City and site plan attached thereto, Addenda E, ROA p.179-185). 
4. Prior to the evening of January 27,1998, the parking area and fire lane 
utilized by City Market, as well as the rest of the common area for the entire shopping 
center, had been involved in a construction/re-paving project. The project was 
concluded at least days, if not weeks, before the Plaintiff was injured. The effects of 
that project were known or should have been known to City Market because it was 
only a few feet away from the main store entryway and affected the entire parking and 
fire lane area for the store. (Addenda D;). 
5. City Market alleges contractual relationships with defendant Barlow-Nielsen 
Associates, Inc., property managers, and the Utah State Retirement Office, owner of 
the property. 
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6. In the early evening hours of January 27,1998, the plaintiff arrived at City 
Market's retail grocery store in Price, Utah for the purposes of purchasing various 
items of merchandise, including three cases of soda pop. (Addenda D). 
7. No signs warned customers of the ha2ardous hole and jagged asphalt which 
subsequendy injured Plaintiff/Appellant even though the hazard was only a few feet 
(estimated at 10-12 feet) from the main entrance to the store. (Addenda D). 
8. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of Plaintiff=s Complaint, a large area had been left 
with a deep opening and was unbarricaded or unmarked in anyway. Since it was dark, 
Plaintiff was unable to see the unmarked hole, which was in the main travel pattern 
between the store's customary parking area and the only public entrance to the store. 
(Addenda D). 
9. As the plaintiff pushed her loaded cart toward her car, which was parked in 
City Market=s customary main parking area, the front right wheel of the shopping 
cart rolled off of the cement apron of the store's entrance and dropped into the large 
hole located where the new asphalt met the cement. This caused the shopping cart to 
lunge frontward into the hole. As it did so, the back of it hit the plaintiff with such 
force that it knocked her down. (Addenda D). 
10. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of Plaintiff=s Complaint, the existence of a deep, 
unbarricaded opening was an obvious hazard in the fire lane immediately adjacent to 
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the entrance and exit of the business. City Market knew or should have known that 
persons would be traveling to and from the store entrance from the parking lot and 
that an open hole in the pavement would be a hazard, particularly during nighttime 
hours. (Addenda D). 
11. Plaintiff sustained substantial injuries as a result of the negligence of 
defendant City Market in leaving the hole unmarked and unbaricaded and failing to 
warn or otherwise protect its business invitees while City Market continued to leave 
its doors open for operation and its parking lots available to the public during 
nighttime store hours. 
12. Defendant City Market filed its motion for summary judgment while 
discovery was still ongoing. On the same day that said Motion was orally argued, and 
just prior thereto, Defendant Barlow-Nielson deposed the Plaintiff. Her deposition 
testimony established that the City Market Manager Sonny had a conversation with 
the Plaintiff/Appellant on or about the date of her injury wherein he acknowledged 
that other people had been injured in the same hazard before the Plaintiff/Appellant 
and that said manager had subsequently caused a stop sign, installed in a stand, to be 
placed in the hole to prevent further injury. (Plaintiffs Depo. line 15 p. 134—line 21 p. 
137; Addenda H). These facts were raised at the oral argument on the motion that 
afternoon. (Transcript of hearing p. 10-28, ROA 230). 
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) '.Ill vIMAKV OF' A R G I J M E N T " 
i ixc Plaintiff/AppelLi i I i i. i I n, i. 1 11 \, i» the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgm«*«« l»i"« HI:vi' it misconstrued and misapplied the Utah premises liability law. The 
trial court basically concluded that a business owner has no duty to its business 
invitees for hazards that exist in areas outside - ., . J court's 
analysis was not consistec nnnr ('i uirt\s standard of review for 
in HI t-< i itlined in the Smith case not* with this Court's analysis 
>nlV - premises liability law as outlined in the Carlile case. 
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the trial i uuxi i i tt.\l m gianting summary 
judgment where there were dhspiin <l r ' ur*' **( fin l that were material to the theories 
o. •:.. . >f which was sufficient u . feat summary judgment 
u ?c standards set forth in the Smith case. The court did not require tne :;: \ ^ 
party to produce any evidence to support the motion for sen . . 
the court require the moving p. avit and supporting 
evidentic < Hrrnl I i,1 Humi'iff The court did not require the moving party to carry the 
burden of proof outlined in Smith. On the contrary, a review of the trial court's 
memorandum decision indicates that the court actually reversed 11 I i h . i l | i < I 
and placed it on the opposing party/JJl I,,ii in ill* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BASED ON CITY MARKET'S ARGUMENT THAT UNDER 
CURRENT UTAH PREMISES LIABILITY LAW, A BUSINESS OWNER 
HAS N O DUTY TO BUSINESS INVITEES WHEN THE INVITEES ARE 
OUTSIDE T H E LEASED PREMISES. 
Plaintiff shall reserve for Point Two the issue of the disputed facts concerning 
what actually constitutes the leased premises in the case at bar and shall turn first to 
an analysis of the current status of premises Kability law in Utah. In Carlile v Wal-Mart, 
61 P.3d 287, 2002 UT App 412 (Utah App. 12/12/2002), the Court of Appeals 
summarized the current status of Utah law on this subject and stated as follows: 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized two classes of negligence 
cases in which a store owner can be held liable: "In the first class, a 
store owner must have either actual or constructive knowledge of 
the hazardous condition." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Mkts., 918 
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (citing Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 
Inc., 538 P.2d 175,176 (Utah 1975)). "In the second class, 
negligence is based on a showing that the store owner created the 
hazardous condition." Carlile, ^|8. 
Applying this two pronged test to the case at bar, the Plaintiffs theories of recovery 
must allege that (1) the store owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
hazardous condition or (2) the store owner created the hazardous condition. Upon 
information and belief, Plaintiff does not contend that City Market created the actual 
hazardous condition, namely, the hole in front of its entry door. Plaintiffs theories of 
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recovery are embraced within •!«^  rioted under the first prong of 
llit tot, i HI i I , nil I nil I mess owner knew of the hazard and didn't protect or 
• •< ie invitee about the danger or that the business owner should have known of 
the hazard and failed to exercise reasonable care in discovering the liaza i I .y id 
protecting or warning the invitee aboi. - ..-. .11 ius c 
Plaintirr --•,,. die case at bar started with a false 
presumj »iion that the hazardous condition must exist on the leased premises for any 
liability to attach. City Market's argument, as adopted by the trial court, is best 
summarized in the statement of their counsel during »-i a .. $ t: 
"Thaf s an area that is not either owned or possessed under lease by 
City Market, at the time of the fall. Consequently, it would be an 
extreme change in Utah law to impose liability—-premises 
liability—on an individual or an entity that is neither the owner nor 
the possessor of the land on which the offense occurred. Now 
that's about as simply as I can put it W> didn't • »wn or posses the 
area where she fell." 
(Transcript of Oral Argument nncb ; • , ^ ^ 
I : - • < *mr ( ourt in the cases above quoted, or any other of the 
modern authorities cited to the trial court during the motion, impose the requirement 
that the hazardous condition be on the leased premises mat; : 
walls" of the leased building as . . . ; . ,
 K ». . t » -* the contrary, as 
pointed \iHile ca^c. Utah has long recognized that a business 
owner has a duty to warn and/or protect its business invitees, irrespective of the 
location of the hazardous condition, as long as the business owner knows or should 
know of same: 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that business owners have 
a duty to protect customers from "'physical harm caused by the 
accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third parties.111 
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1955)); see also 
Pagan v. Thrift City, 23 Utah 2d 207, 460 P.2d 832, 834 (1969). 
Business owners further have a duty to '"discover that such acts are 
being done or are Likely to be done'" or "Vive a warning adequate 
to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect 
them against it™ Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 344). However, "that duty does not arise until 
the business owner knows, or should know, that [such] acts are 
likely to occur." Carlile, ^[12. 
The correct analysis looks to what a reasonable business owner knows or 
should reasonably foresee about the risks that exist to his business invitees and not 
just to the location of the hazardous condition. That latter approach encourages 
business owners to retreat into their "four walls" and ignore risks, while the former 
analysis requires a business owner to be reasonable and prudent in the operation of 
the business. Following this Court's analysis in Carlile, one should look to the nature 
and circumstances around the hazardous condition: 
In defining this first class of premises liability, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that a hazardous condition "involves some unsafe 
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condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on 
the floor and usually where it is not known how it got there. In this 
class of cases it is quite universally held that fault cannot be 
imputed to the defendant so [no] liability results therefrom unless 
two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, 
that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because 
the condition had existed long enough that he should have 
discovered it: and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have 
remedied i t Schnuphase, 91 a "P ?d at478 (citation omitted). Carlile, 
H9 FEmphasis added]. 
Application of these standards to the case at bar demonstrates tiiut i'Liiuiil I 
legal theories, as alleged in her complaint, were sutncu < y 
judgment motion i; .... v,•: J^ ^plied by the trial court. The facts 
estabksl ' » "\ '" hilul w.is doing business in a shopping center in Price, Utah. 
City Market represented to Price City that, in addition to its building, it also has a right 
to the use of a designated number of specific parking suu. . 
that surround its store, as designs i< it is asserted by City Market that 
those atcas MV C< mini n ,uvas of the tenants of the shopping center even though the 
parking lot and fire lane in question are not in close proximity to the other t enan t . 
the shopping center.. City Market's representation ; i : m 
parking and fire lane areas haa &willfc>" r u s from 1980 until the 
date of Plan a i °%\ a period of almost twenty years. Price 
City granted a business license to City Market each of those years in reliance on those 
representations. A jury could reasonably infer that City Market knew or should have 
known that the majority of their business invitees routinely parked in that designated 
parking lot and walked across the fire lane in a direct path toward the only public 
entrance to the store. A jury could also reasonably infer that a major construction 
project that repaved the entire shopping center parking lots and fire lane areas would 
have been discussed and planned with the store owners and that the store owners 
would have been monitoring same because of the impact on their businesses. A jury 
could also reasonably conclude that hundreds of people, including store management 
and employees, being funneled through one store entrance, would see a large hole in 
the pavement where the fire lane abuts the cement apron which forms the store's 
entrance since the hole was in plain view and within 12 feet of the door during 
daylight hours. Unlike the ice cream in the Schnuphase case , which can fall from a 
freezer and melt in minutes, asphalt that has been laid sufficiendy long enough for the 
public to be allowed to park and walk across it, did not spontaneously create a hole by 
itself just in time to trap an unsuspecting customer pushing a loaded cart at night It 
was alleged that the construction had ended before Plaintiffs injury. It was 
undisputed that all equipment and barricades were gone and that the parking lot and 
fire lane areas had been reopened to the public. The hole had been there long enough 
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that City Market Manager N . i ' ' *11 i n I i H' I •. I" u I put a stop sign, imbedded in a 
stand, *Ment because she had not been the first person to fall 
i*.. i,,oc \ ;,„, could reasonably conclude from those facts that City Market liiiil 
direct knowledge of the hole or, at the very least, that a prudcnl iiiiiJ ICMSI jniihlc1 store 
owner would have discovered ti .. :. 11111 L i k i11 -.. 111< * a 111 rmative action to protect 
the business .mm * "•« 
B y contrast, the trial court starts its ruling by concluding that City Market did 
not have a duty to its business invitees in the common parking areas 
Dwiggins and Pagan cases as being compelling j ; i > n *p( >sition. ^< x 
review c * • .. , ! '^> - • -1 nly for the proposition that an event must 
be reasi »n;il »ly foreseeable to impose liability; but that if the event is reasonably 
foreseeable, then the business owner has a duty to the im iui ,,, uwiggm t 
plaintiff was making a purchase lrom .uorga^ (.•.'•*- - -.- ,
 ; -obbed 
and the plaintiff T. • welers had no significant history of 
: * not lax in its safety plans, the court found that the robbery was not 
a reasonably foreseeable event. The court went on to point out numerous cases 
where business owners have been held naou when the 
risk to the business invitee was foreseeable Fov ^v-.ibilin is generally a factual issue 
!
 ' * Mse by case basis. Applying the foreseeability requirement 
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in Dwiggins to the case at bar makes an even stronger argument for the Plaintiffs 
claim. An open hole in the asphalt within 12 feet of the only entrance to a busy 
supermarket and directly in line between the routinely used parking area for that store 
and the sole entrance creates not only a reasonably foreseeable risk to the invitees, but 
a highly likely risk. Add the fact that City Market invited its customers to shop at 
night in the dark, knowing that those customers had to approach the store on a direct 
collision path with the hole and the highly likely risk becomes an almost guaranteed 
injury. 
The trial court's reliance on the Pagan case is even more confusing. It should 
be noted that the Pagan case was decided in 1969, which places it in the earliest stages 
of the development of the duty/risk analysis that is now utilized in our courts. 
Although the case is still valid law, it lacks the analysis of its more modern successors. 
In Pagan, defendant Thrift City leased a portion of its parking lot to a circus. A 
mother, attempting to get to the aid of her child on the merry-go-around, was injured. 
She filed suit against both the circus and Thrift City. On appeal from an order 
granting judgment to Thrift City, the court held that since there was no evidence that 
the merry-go-round was defective and no evidence of negligent operation by the 
circus, Thrift City could not be held liable for that which it did not know or could not 
discover. It should also be noted that the circus prevailed at trial for the same reasons. 
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• A.
 ti: Me court iin.1 • lah (M »sscss«i H ^ A hind who holds it open to the 
public mi IHISJIU,^ |"ii|>osi^ ^ subject to liability for injuries to members of the 
r^e harm is caused by negligent or intentional acts of third persons provided 
the possessor of the land failed to exercise reasonable care to discover uiai v s 
are being done or likely to be done, or iu gj\\ . ( j '^( victors to 
avoid harm." iJagan, 
meets each of the elements for liability in the above quote if we 
assume that City Market has some possessory interest in the common areas. City 
Market contends that third parties, namely dclenuant r>au- <. \ >t i-. • • • •. 
harm to the Plaintiff by their negligent " larket has failed to 
shov .ci\. <,:-•* '-an- to discover that such acts were being done or to 
give .ttihip that was adequate to enable visitors to avoid harm, even though that 
harm was plainly observable within a few feet of its uoor. Plaintiff has allegeu 
City Market failed on each <>i those uuucr, iun» • ^ ^sonable 
care .. »:, ~ warn the public. There were sufficient facts 
aUcjK'i r disputed, from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
hazardous condition either was actually known to City Market or that the i i:J' J i LI 
have been known to City Market because of .i. 
in front of the door l . l-usiin ,*. .' .. I . lucldi i latent defect as alleged about the 
merry-go-round in Pagan, but is a known hazard in plain view of any reasonable 
business owner and one that creates a duty to protect and to warn. 
Since the trial court misconstrued the duty owed by a business owner to its 
business invitees, Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment and remand the case for completion of discovery and trial. 
POINT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHERE DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED, 
PARTICULARLY, WHERE THOSE DISPUTED FACTS WERE 
DIRECTLY RELATED TO PLAINTIFF'S THEORIES OF RECOVERY. 
The standard of review on a motion for summary judgment has previously 
been quoted verbatim, discussed at length and cited in the Standard of Review section 
of this brief. The authorities cited therein, and the Smith case in particular, emphasi2e 
that the burden rests on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence 
and/or undisputed facts sufficient to entitle the moving party to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
There must exist undisputed facts in the evidence before the trial 
court relating to each of the elements of the legal doctrine upon 
which the trial court rests its decision to grant summary judgment 
in order for us to affirm the ruling. The existence of even one 
question of fact precludes us from granting summary judgment 
[Quoting Smith, <J24 and 153]. 
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Applying these principles .A that the trial court 
not orm igu ^ ^raited issues of fact, but also reversed the 
of from the moving party to the opposing party. Defendant City 
Market filed its motion for summary judgment without any supporting affidavits or 
evidence of any kind and expressly excluding iu .;:>egcu n ac n a;> 
short supporting memorau < building in which it conducted 
Us biiMiiu,:, .mil rhrrpf'Mt remises liability was limited to tliose four walls. It 
expressly disavowed any lease, authority over or responsibility for the parking lot and 
fire lane, which it defined as common areas oi u^ shopping center. 
Plaintiff disputed those assci in HI.1, V IIII IIK wmm ,iffid,ivil of Ms. Penovich 
from ' ; ^ > r r davit included City Market's own site plan 
- hcnvin- what it represented to Price City was its designated portion of the parking 
area and the fire lane—a fire lane which the site plan shows services only City 
Market's isolated portion of the shopping m m ' at": \iv" ^-^fird 
Market itr nlan in order to first obtain, and then renew, 
its biisiness license for almost twenty years prior to the time of PlaintifFs injury. That 
disputed fact alone went to the very heart of the trial court's reasoning, because A 
challenged the very premise on which the court res led liiii', li I K," miijiij', at 
a duty was not owed . •< area. 
.1 
The standard of review required that the moving party carry the burden of 
proving its lack of duty in the common areas. Since City Market failed to offer 
anything at all by way of evidence , since it failed to show undisputed facts for each of 
the elements of Plaintiffs theories of liability and specifically since they did not rebut 
the Penovich affidavit offered by the Plaintiff, the trial court should have found that 
a disputed issue of fact existed, that it related direcdy to the scope of defendant's duty 
and, therefore, summary judgment was precluded. 
Additionally, Plaintiff alleged that city market knew or should have known of 
the hazardous condition located directly outside of its store entrance. Defendant City 
Market merely denied that a duty existed in what it defined as a common area. The 
burden was on defendant as the moving party to provide evidence that would refute, 
as a matter of law, the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the undisputed 
facts. Facts like hundreds of people came and went from City Market's customary 
parking area to the only public store entrance on a daily basis for twenty years and 
that a prudent business owner would be expected to know that information and 
inspect and repair any hazards that developed in that traffic pattern, whether he had 
an obligation under contract to make those repairs or not Facts like a hole located in 
a main traffic pattern was even more dangerous if the business owner conducted 
business at night and the hole was hidden from the artificial light by the pillar which 
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supported the defendant's L, aiding s liwimig . * *:^:vinr 
project had been t had been removed and the 
pinking I u. ii I In*1 lanes had reopened for public use, Undisputed facts which the 
court not only ignored but seemed to refute, without any evidence from the defendant, 
by concluding that the Plaintiff had not proved that 'die LXI^IK^; :: - - ** 
to discover the detect ^ * »i «" t< ,r «»n tbly f* ^'rsrcj-1 "iiuse 
sfc.ic:. "; Jon indicate that the trial court misunderstood 
. --Vn r f proof required of the defendant and may even have improperly 
reversed it to place the burden on the Plaintiff. 
Finally, since discovery was onguung-^i . -'"- !•<,•• - T-
c o n d u c , , an, Plaintiff offered information 
-position to support Plaintiffs allegations in her complaint that City 
Market actually knew the hazard existed. The deposition brouglit to light a 
conversation between defendant's manage: . 
i .aiiruii .... ! . ' ? i le said that after Plaintiffs injury, 
* n Hrr wliich was imbedded in a stand, and placed it in the hole to 
prevent further injuries. That deposition testimony supported Plaintiffs theory of 
actual knowledge under the first prong of tnc ic:; IUI pa.*- -i • Jity mid i.iised 
disputed issues of Ln I going JHULLI it n dc* ] • wledge of the hazard 
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and its exercise of dominion and control over the common area which it had 
previously denied. 
Since any one of the above stated disputed facts should have precluded 
summary judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand the case for completion of 
discovery and trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the trial court did not apply the appropriate requirements and burdens of 
proof for a motion for summary judgment as outlined in the Smith case, and since the 
trial court misconstrued Utah's premises liability law and came to conclusions 
inconsistent with the Carlile case, Plaintiff prays that this Court reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case back to the trial court for 
the completion of discovery and the scheduling of trial as expeditiously as possible as 
this is an interlocutory appeal and the defendant not involved in this matter as been 
delayed during the pendency of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of November, 2004. 
JoanriP^pajB/Whke 
Attorney of^Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDA "A 
RULE 52, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Findings by the Court* 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court 
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings 
may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the 
district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of 
fact 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for 
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is 
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. 
Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, 
and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
1 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this 
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
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ADDENDA "B 
PRICE CITY ORDIANANCES 
NO. 6-4-] AND L, 
NOW 6.14.13 
CHAPTER 6 
OFF-STREET PARKING REQUIREMENTS 
6-1 OFF-STREET PARKING REQUIRED 
At the time any building or structure is erected or enlarged 
or increased in capacity or any use is established, there 
shall be provided off-street parking spaces for automobiles 
in accordance with the following requirements, or as 
otherwise required by conditional use permit. 
6-2 SIZE 
The dimensions of each off-street parking space, exclusive of 
access drives or aisles, shall be at least ten (10) feet by twenty 
(20) feet for diagonal and ninety-degree spaces; and ten (10) 
feet by twenty-two (22) feet for parallel spaces. 
6-3 ACCESS TO INDIVIDUAL PARKING SPACE 
Except for single-family and two-family dwellings, direct 
access to each parking space shall be from a private 
driveway and not from a public street. All parking spaces 
shall have independent access not blocked by another 
parking space or other obstacle. 
6-1 NUMBER OF PARKING SPACES REQUIRED 
A. Business or Professional Offices. One parking space 
for each 200 sq. ft. of floor area. 
B. Churches with Fixed Seating. One parking space 
for each 3.5 fixed seats, or one parking space for each seven 
(7) feet of linear pew, whichever is greater. 
C. Churches Without Fixed Seats, Sports Arenas, 
Auditoriums, Theaters, Assembly Halls, Meeting Rooms. 
One parking space for each 3 seats of maximum seating 
capacity. 
D. Dwellings. Two parking spaces for each dwelling 
unit. 
E. Furniture and Appliance Stores. One parking 
space for each 600 sq. ft. of floor area. 
F. Hospitals. Two parking spaces for each bed. 
G. Hotels, Motels, Motor Hotels. One space for each 
living or sleeping unit, plus parking space for all accessory 
uses as herein specified. 
H., Nursing Homes. Four parking spaces, plus one 
space for each five beds. 
I. Restaurants, Taverns, Private Clubs, and All Other 
Similar Dining and/or Drinking Establishments. One parking 
space for each 3.5 seats or one parking space for each 100 
square feet of floor area (excluding kitchen, storage, etc.), 
whichever is greater. 
J. Retail Stores, Except as Provided in No. (E) above. 
One parking space for each 100 square feet of retail floor 
space. 
K. Wholesale Establishments, Warehouses, Manufac-
turing Establishments, and All Industrial Uses. As 
determined by conditional use permit or by planned unit 
development requirements, if applicable, or by the Planning 
Commission, but in no case fewer than one space for each 
employee projected for the highest employment shift. 
L. Shopping Center or Other Groups of Uses Not 
Listed Above. One parking space for each 150 square feet of 
total floor space, or as determined by conditional use permit. 
M. All Other Uses Not Listed Above. As determined 
by conditional use permit based on the nearest comparable 
use standards. 
6-5 ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 
Adequate ingress and egress to and from all uses shall be 
provided as follows: 
A. Residential Lots. For each residential lot: not 
more than one driveway which shall be a maximum of 
twenty (20) feet wide at the street lot line. 
B. Other Than Residential Lots. Access shall be 
provided to meet the following requirements: 
1. Not more than two (2) driveways shall be 
used for each one hundred (100) feet of frontage on any 
street. 
2. No two (2) of said driveways shall be closer to 
each other than twelve (12) feet, and no driveway shall be 
closer to a side property line than three (3) feet. 
3. Each driveway shall be not more than 
thirty-five (35) feet wide, measured at right angles to the 
VII 
space for esch ?£, J square feet of floor area, whichever is greater. 
6.4.10.1 In action, drive-in facilities shall provide sufficient stacking aisa for cars in a drive 
through lane IF? such a way as not to overhang or back up on public property. 
6.4.11 RETAIL STORES: except as provided in No. 6.4.5 above: one parking space for each 2r 
square feet of retail floor space. 
6.4.11.1 In addition, convenience stores which sell gasoline shall provide sufficient stacking 
area for cars in drive through lanes in such a way as not to overhang or back up on public 
property. 
6.4.11.2The stacking area may be considered to heip fulfill the basic parking requirements 
6.4.12 WHOLESALE ESTABLISHMENTS, WAREHOUSES, MANUFACTURING 
ESTABLISHMENTS, AND ALL INDUSTRIAL USES: as determined by conditional use permit or 
by planned unit development requirements, if applicable, or by the Planning Commission, but in 
no case fewer than 1 space for each employee projected for the highest employment shift. 
6.4.13 SHOPPING CENTER OR OTHER GROUPS OF USES NOT LISTED ABOVE: one 
parking space for each 200 square feet of total floor space, or as determined by conditional use 
permit 
6.4.14 ALL OTHER USES NOT LISTED ABOVE: as determined by conditional use permit 
based on the nearest comparable use standards. 
6.4.14.1 Sufficient parking should be provided to assure: 
6.4.14.1.1 maximum utilization of the facilities on site will not unduly impose on neighbors 
rights in the vicinity; 
6.4.14.1.2 that in the future if there is a change of use that the parking is adequately 
related to the site so that a new use has a reasonable chance to provide satisfactory 
parking; 
6.4.14.1.3 where precise applicable parking standards are not known or have proven 
unsatisfactory in other instances, the analysis of the parking requirements of the site a: 
its proposed use is to assure a reasonable number of parking spaces that cannot become 
an excuse for failure of the use on the site to perform its function properly; and 
6.4.14.1.4 the intent of minimum parking requirements is that normal or competitive 
functions are not to be curtailed due to lack of sufficient parking and therefore the use or 
function of the principal user of the site fails or otherwise deteriorates. 
6.4.15 It shall be the responsibility of the reviewing body to prepare its analysis of parking 
requirements in writing and make copies available to the property owner(s)/lessee(s) and other 
parties of interest as well as the city council. 
6.4.16 No parking on sidewalks or designated pedestrian paths. 
6.4.17 Parking for disabled individuals shall be provided meeting ADA requirements. 
6.5 ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 
6.5.1 Adequate ingress and egress to and from all uses shall be provided as follows: 
6.5.1.1 RESIDENTIAL LOTS. For each residential lot not more than 1 access driveway 
which shall be a maximum of 20 feet wide at the street lot line, except lots with a frontage 
greater than 100 feet have the option to provide 2 access driveways each up to 12 feet wide 
for circular driveways and other special type circulation and parking. 
6.5.1.2 OTHER THAN RESIDENTIAL LOTS. Access shall be provided to meet the 
following requirements: 
PRICE CITY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CODE 
CHAPTER 6, PAGE 
ADDENDA"C 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES ACT, 
SECTION 63-30D301. 
WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY-EXCEPTIONS 
Utah Government Immunity Act, Section 63-30d-301. Waivers of 
immunity — Exceptions. 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any 
Contractual obligation. Emphasis Added. 
(2)Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations are not subject to 
the requirements of Sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-
601. 
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water 
from a reservoir or associated facility authorized by Tide 73, Chapter 26, Bear 
River Development Act, if the failure to deliver the contractual amount of 
water is due to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that causes 
a deficiency in the amount of available water. 
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived: 
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or quiet title to 
real or personal property; 
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or other Kens on real or 
personal property, to determine any adverse claim on real or personal property, 
or to obtain an adjudication about any mortgage or other lien that the 
governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal property; 
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, damage, or loss of 
goods, merchandise, or other property while it is in the possession of any 
governmental entity or employee, if the property was seized for the purpose of 
forfeiture under any provision of state law; 
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(l), as to any action brought under the 
authority of Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has 
taken or damaged private property for public uses without just compensation; 
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any action brought to recover 
attorneys1 fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802; or 
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah's Protection of 
Public Employees Act 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each 
governmental entity is waived as to any injury caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, 
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure 
located on them; or 
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam, 
reservoir, or other public improvement. 
(b) Immunity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located on them; or 
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment. 
(5) Immunity is not waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises 
out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a 
discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with 
contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authori2ation; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, 
even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; 
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and 
civil disturbances; 
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or 
other place of legal confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation, 
or any activity authored by the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(1) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the 
clearing of fog; 
(m) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(o) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance 
with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(p) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous 
wastes; 
(iv) emergency evacuations; 
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency 
medical assistance can be rendered or where the person can be transported by a 
licensed ambulance service; or 
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies; 
(q) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, any 
function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources - Division 
of Water Resources; or 
(r) unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic 
information systems by any person or entity. 
ADDENDA "D" 
PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATTY HEVELONE, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
CITY MARKET, INC. 
a Colorado Corporation, 
THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
OFFICE, and BARLOW NIELSEN 
ASSOCIATES, INC., JOHN DOES 1-5 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, 
Joane Pappas White, and hereby complains of the Defendants and 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTIONAL aT.T.fffi&TTnwg 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Carbon County, State of 
Utah, and has been at all times material hereto. 
2. City Market, Inc., a Colorado corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as City Market, is authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah. Said corporation operated a local 
City Market retail store in Price, Carbon County, State of Utah 
at the time applicable hereto. 
^Rieif 
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3. The Utah State Retirement Office, hereinafter 
referred to as State Retirement, is the owner of the property 
upon which the City Market retail store was located in Price, 
Carbon County, State of Utah at the time applicable hereto. 
4. That Barlow Nielsen Associates, Inc., hereinafter 
referred to as Barlow Nielsen, a Utah corporation, in the 
business of managing real estate for property owners, was the 
property manager for Defendant Retirement Office, on the subject 
property located in Price, Carbon County, State of Utah. 
5. John Does 1-5 are persons and/or entities currently 
unknown to the Plaintiff who may have been responsible for or 
contributed to the accident which gives rise to this cause of 
action. 
6. The amount in controversy exceeds the minimum 
limits for jurisdiction in the District Court, exclusive of 
costs. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. In the early evening hours of January 27, 1998, the 
Plaintiff had entered Defendant City Market's retail grocery 
store in Price, Carbon County, State of Utah for purposes of 
purchasing various items of merchandise, particularly three cases 
of soda pop. 
8. As Plaintiff walked out of the Defendant City 
Market's grocery store, pushing her grocery cart filled with 
2 
three cases of soda popf she turned and approached the paved 
portion of the parking lot. Suddenly the front right wheel of 
the shopping cart dropped into a large opening which appears to 
have been an open manhole, which caused the shopping cart to 
lunge forward into the hole. As the cart lunged forward, the back 
of it popped up and hit the Plaintiff with such force that it 
knocked her down. 
9. Plaintiff received a significant blow to her left 
knee as the rear of the shopping cart raised into the air. The 
blow to the Plaintiff s left knee and left portion of her body 
had knocked her to the ground and a bystander had to help her 
back to her feet. 
10. The Plaintiff observed that the actions of the 
shopping cart were the direct result of the fact that a manhole 
area had been left with a large deep opening and unbarricaded or 
unmarked in any way as part of a re-paving and/or construction 
project in the parking area. 
11. Defendant City Market knew or should have known 
that it's business invitees would be traveling back and forth 
across the paved parking area immediately adjacent to their store 
front in order to enter and exit the store property and that 
during the night time hours, business invitees could be injured 
as a result of the unbarricaded opening located in the pavement. 
That Defendant City Market was negligent in failing to warn its 
3 
business invitees or take other steps necessary to protect its 
business invitees from such hazard. 
12. To the best of Plaintiff's information and belief, 
the property upon which the City Market store is located in owned 
by the Utah State Retirement Office and is managed on their 
behalf by Barlow Nielson Associates, Inc., a professional 
property manager. Said property owner and its agent manager knew 
or should have known that construction projects were ongoing in 
the parking lot area adjacent to its tenant's City Market store 
and that said landlord and its agent have a duty to maintain the 
property in a safe and reasonable manner. That the presence of a 
deep unbarricded opening was an obvious hazard in the parking 
area, particularly when it was adjacent to the entrance and exit 
of a busy retail store. That they knew or should have known that 
persons would be traveling to and from the business entrance and 
that an open hole in the pavement would be a hazard, particularly 
during night time hours. 
13. That the Defendants, and each of them, owed a duty 
to the Plaintiff with respect to the maintenance of the property 
upon which the City Market store was located and that they were 
negligent in the performance of said duty and that their 
negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries 
sustained by the Plaintiff on January 27, 1998. 
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14. As a result of the Defendants negligence. Plaintiff 
sustained injuries and has incurred past and present medical 
expenses and will continue to incur future medical expenses in a 
amount to be more specifically proven at the time of trial. 
15. Since the date of injury, the Plaintiff has 
continued to experience significant problems with her left knee 
and the problems have continued to a point where the Plaintiff 
anticipates the necessity of surgery. 
16. Plaintiff has sustained a permanent partial 
disability/impairment as a result of the injury sustained in the 
City Market parking lot on January 27, 21998 and the Defendants, 
and each of them, are responsible therefore. 
17. The Defendants, and each of them, knew or should 
have known, and it was reasonable foreseeable, that in business 
invitees to the City Market store could be injured in the event 
that they stepped into the open manhole area in the asphalt. 
18. It was reasonable foreseeable to all of the 
Defendants that the Plaintiff would be injured in the event that 
she either fell into such a hole or was hit by a shopping cart 
that fell into the hole and, therefore, the Plaintiff's injuries 
were directly and proximately caused by the negligence of the 
Defendants, and each of them. 
19. The Plaintiff has incurred substantial physical and 
mental pain and suffering and anguish as a result of the injuries 
5 
she sustained in the subject incident and she requests an award 
of damage for such loss. 
20. The Plaintiff has incurred lost earnings and lost 
enjoyment of life as a result of the injuries sustained in this 
incident and requests an award of same. 
21. Plaintiff will incur court costs and attorneys 
fees in this matter and requests an award of same. 
22. Plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date of 
the injury until the date of entry of judgment and interest on 
any judgment issued herein at the legal rate. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. Plaintiff prays for a trial by jury; and 
2. The Plaintiff prays that she be awarded past, 
present and future medical expenses in an amount to be more fully 
proven at the time of trial but in at least the sum of $10,400.00 
in past medical expenses; and 
3. That Plaintiff be awarded damages for her permanent 
partial disability/impairment; and 
4. That Plaintiff be awarded damages for her past, 
present and future loss of earnings and/or earning capacity; and 
5. That Plaintiff be awarded damages for past, present 
and future mental and physical pain, suffering and anguish caused 
as a result of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and which 
were proximately caused by the negligence of the Defendants, and 
6 
each of them; and 
6. That Plaintiff be awarded damages for her lost 
enjoyment of life and activity in an amount to be more fully 
proven at the time of trial; and 
7. That the Plaintiff be awarded her Court costs and 
attorneys fees in this matter; and 
8. That Plaintiff be awarded interest from the date of 
injury until the entry of judgment and that any judgment issued 
herein bear interest at the legal rate; and 
9. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this of January, 2002. 
^TOANE PAPPAS WHITE 
'--^ Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDA "E" 
AFFIDAVIT OF MOLLY PENOVICH 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATTY HEVELONE, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
CITY MARKET, INC. 
a Colorado Corporation, 
THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
OFFICE, and BARLOW NIELSEN ] 
ASSOCIATES, INC., ] 
JOHN DOES 1-5 1 
Defendants. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MOLLY 
) PENOVICH 
1 Case No. 020700047 
( Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
I, Molly Penovich, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of three employees of the Planning and Zoning 
Department for Price City, Utah, who has official access to the 
records of said department. I have researched said records and 
found the attached site plan filed by City Market in 1980. 
2. Attached is the site plan presented by City Market in 
1980, showing their building and their required parking spaces. 
Those parking spaces were required in order to obtain the City 
1 
Market original business license from that time period. (See 
attached Exhibit A ) . 
3. Price City requires all businesses to provide a minium 
number of parking spaces for their customers as more fully 
outlined in Ordinance No. 6-4-J and L of the Price City 
Ordinances. Said ordinances were modified by the Price City Land 
Use Management and Development Code of 1997. (Both original 
ordinance and the revised ordinance are attached hereto as 
Exhibit B). 
4. City Market's parking site plan remained basically the 
same throughout the years they were licensed to conduct business 
in Price City, Utah, including 1998. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2004. 
Molly Penoi/^ch 
Employee of Price City 
Planning and Zoning Dept. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _£3?_^day of 
January, 2004. 
KATHLEEN ATW00D 
100 N. 200 W. #13 
HUNTINGTON, UT 84528 
COMM. EXPIRES 12-2-2007 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FACSIMILE 
I hereby certify that on the 23RD day of January, 2004, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Affidavit of Molly Penovich to be sent by United States mail, 
first class postage prepaid to: 
Scott Christensen 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant City Market 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey C. Miner, No. 7258 
MORGAN, MINNOCK 6 Rice 
136 South Main Street 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Secretary !-
3 
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CHAPTER 6 
OFF-STREET PARKING REQUIREMENTS 
6-1 OFF-STREET PARKING REQUIRED 
At the time any building or structure is erected or enlarged 
or increased in capacity or any use is established, there 
shall be provided off-street parking spaces for automobiles 
in accordance with the following requirements, or as 
otherwise required by conditional use permit. 
6-2 SIZE 
The dimensions of each off-street parking space, exclusive of 
access drives or aisles, shall be at least ten (10) feet by twenty 
(20) feet for diagonal and ninety-degree spaces; and ten (10) 
feet by twenty-two (22) feet for parallel spaces. 
6-3 ACCESS TO INDIVIDUAL PARKING SPACE 
Except for single-family and two-family dwellings, direct 
access to each parking space shall be from a private 
driveway and not from a public street. All parking spaces 
shall have independent access not blocked by another 
parking space or other obstacle. 
6-4 NUMBER OF PARKING SPACES REQUIRED 
A. Business or Professional Offices. One parking space 
for each 200 sq. ft. of floor area. 
B. Churches with Fixed Seating. One parking space 
for each 3.5 fixed seats, or one parking space for each seven 
(7) feet of linear pew, whichever is greater. 
C. Churches Without Fixed Seats, Sports Arenas, 
Auditoriums, Theaters, Assembly Halls, Meeting Rooms. 
One parking space for each 3 seats of maximum seating 
capacity. 
D. Dwellings. Two parking spaces for each dwelling 
unit. 
E. Furniture and Appliance Stores. One parking 
space for each 600 sq. ft. of floor area. 
F. Hospitals. Two parking spaces for each bed. 
G. Hotels, Motels, Motor Hotels. One space for each 
living or sleeping unit, plus parking space for all accessory 
uses as herein specified. 
H., Nursing Homes. Four parking spaces, plus one 
space for each five beds. 
I. Restaurants, Taverns, Private Clubs, and All Other 
Similar Dining and/or Drinking Establishments. One parking 
space for each 3.5 seats or one parking space for each 100 
square feet of floor area (excluding kitchen, storage, etc.), 
whichever is greater. 
J. Retail Stores, Except as Provided in No. (E) above. 
One parking space for each 100 square feet of retail floor 
space. 
K. Wholesale Establishments, Warehouses, Manufac-
turing Establishments, and All Industrial Uses. As 
determined by conditional use permit or by planned unit 
development requirements, if applicable, or by the Planning 
Commission, but in no case fewer than one space for each 
employee projected for the highest employment shift. 
L. Shopping Center or Other Groups of Uses Not 
Listed Above. One parking space for each 150 square feet of 
total floor space, or as determined by conditional use permit. 
M. All Other Uses Not Listed Above. As determined 
by conditional use permit based on the nearest comparable 
use standards. 
6-5 ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 
Adequate ingress and egress to and from all uses shall be 
provided as follows: 
A. Residential Lots. For each residential lot: not 
more than one driveway which shall be a maximum of 
twenty (20) feet wide at the street lot line. 
B. Other Than Residential Lots. Access shall be 
provided to meet the following requirements: 
1. Not more than two (2) driveways shall be 
used for each one hundred (100) feet of frontage on any 
street. 
2. No two (2) of said driveways shall be closer to 
each other than twelve (12) feet, and no driveway shall be 
closer to a side property line than three (3) feet. 
3. Each driveway shall be not more than 
thirty-five (35) feet wide, measured at right angles to the 
V I I 
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space for each 200 square feet of floor area, whichever is greater. 
6.4.10.1 In addition, drive-in facilities shall provide sufficient stacking area for cars in a drive 
through lane in such a way as not to overhang or back up on public property. 
6.4.11 RETAIL STORES: except as provided in No. 6.4.5 above: one parking space for each 2C 
square feet of retail floor space. 
6.4.11.1 In addition, convenience stores which sell gasoline shall provide sufficient stacking 
area for cars in drive through lanes in such a way as not to overhang or back up on public 
property. 
6.4.11.2The stacking area may be considered to help fulfill the basic parking requirements 
6.4.12 WHOLESALE ESTABLISHMENTS, WAREHOUSES, MANUFACTURING 
ESTABLISHMENTS, AND ALL INDUSTRIAL USES: as determined by conditional use permit or 
by planned unit development requirements, if applicable, or by the Planning Commission, but in 
no case fewer than 1 space for each employee projected for the highest employment shift. 
6.4.13 SHOPPING CENTER OR OTHER GROUPS OF USES NOT LISTED ABOVE: one 
parking space for each 200 square feet of total floor space, or as determined by conditional use 
permit. 
6.4.14 ALL OTHER USES NOT LISTED ABOVE: as determined by conditional use permit 
based on the nearest comparable use standards. 
6.4.14.1 Sufficient parking should be provided to assure: 
6.4.14.1.1 maximum utilization of the facilities on site will not unduly impose on neighbors 
rights in the vicinity; 
6.4.14.1.2 that in the future if there is a change of use that the parking is adequately 
related to the site so that a new use has a reasonable chance to provide satisfactory 
parking; 
6.4.14.1.3 where precise applicable parking standards are not known or have proven 
unsatisfactory in other instances, the analysis of the parking requirements of the site a: 
its proposed use is to assure a reasonable number of parking spaces that cannot become 
an excuse for failure of the use on the site to perform its function properly; and 
6.4.14.1.4 the intent of minimum parking requirements is that normal or competitive 
functions are not to be curtailed due to lack of sufficient parking and therefore the use or 
function of the principal user of the site fails or otherwise deteriorates. 
6.4.15 It shall be the responsibility of the reviewing body to prepare its analysis of parking 
requirements in writing and make copies available to the property owner(s)/lessee(s) and other 
parties of interest, as well as the city council. 
6.4.16 No parking on sidewalks or designated pedestrian paths. 
6.4.17 Parking for disabled individuals shall be provided meeting ADA requirements. 
6.5 ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 
6.5.1 Adequate ingress and egress to and from all uses shall be provided as follows: 
6.5.1.1 RESIDENTIAL LOTS. For each residential lot not more than 1 access driveway 
which shall be a maximum of 20 feet wide at the street lot line, except lots with a frontage 
greater than 100 feet have the option to provide 2 access driveways each up to 12 feet wide 
for circular driveways and other special type circulation and parking. 
6.5.1.2 OTHER THAN RESIDENTIAL LOTS. Access shall be provided to meet the 
following requirements: 
PRICE CITY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CODE 
CHAPTER 6, PAGE: A 
ADDENDA"F 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT, 
CITY MARKET, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FOR 
FILED 
APR - 5 2004 
SFVENTH DISTRICT 
COURT 
PATTY HEVELONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY MARKET, INC., et al 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
DEFENDANT, CITY MARKET, INC's 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020700047 
Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
The Court having heard Oral Arguments on the 17th day of February, 2004, and having 
now reviewed the pleadings as well as the case law cited by the parties, concludes that the 
Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken as same is applicable to defendant, City Market 
Inc. The Court could find no question of fact that prevents the granting of the relief sought by 
defendant, City Market. The Court believes, as contended by City Market, that the plaintifFhas 
failed to establish a duty of City Market to the business invitees while such business invitees are in 
the common use parking area involved herein. The Court found particularly compelling the 
arguments made by defendant and the citations to the Dwiggins vs. Morgan Jewelry's case and 
especially the Pagan vs. Thrift City case where the Court, even though Thrift City was apparently the 
possessor of the parking area, at least to the extent that it granted permission to the Siebrand Circus 
for the use thereof, was nevertheless held not responsible for injuries. The Court also believes that, 
as alleged by City Market, the plaintiff failed to establish that City Market had any actual or 
constructive knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition or that City Market was aware of the 
condition for a suflBcient time to have taken measures to correct the problem. The paucity or absence 
of evidence thereto was controlling in the Court's conclusion that the Motion for Summary Judgment 
against the plaintiff in favor of City Market should be and is hereby granted. 
City Market's counsel is instructed to draft Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order accordingly. 
Dated this 6" day of April, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 5 ^ day of April, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT, CITY MARKET, inc., 
COLORADO CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT , postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Plant, Christensen & Kanell, P.C., 136 E. S. Temple, Suite #1700, SLC, UT 84111 
Joane Pappas White, Attorney at Law, Fifth Street Plaza, #1, 475 E. Main, Price, UT 84501 
Joseph E. Minock, Esq., Morgan, Minnock & Rice, PC, Kearns Bldg, 8* Floor, 136 S. Main 
Street, SLC, UT 84101 
" r g 7 ^ n » t k ^ / P Y N ^ 
Court Clerk 
ADDENDA "G: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
FILED 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)363-7611 
Attorneys for Defendant City Market, Inc. 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATTY HEVELONE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY MARKET, INC., a Colorado 
corporation, THE UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT OFFICE, and BARLOW 
NIELSEN ASSOCIATES, INC., JOHN 
DOES 1 - 5, 
Defendants. 
Defendant, City Market Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court on 
February 17,2004 for Oral Arguments. The Court, having heard oral arguments, having reviewed the 
motions and authorities cited therein, and being fully advised, enters the following Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and resulting Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. 020700047 
Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
Plaintiff has failed to establish a duty of City Market Inc. to its business invitees while 
such business invitees are in the common use parking area. 
Plaintiff has failed to establish that City Market Inc. had actual or constructive notice of 
the allegedly dangerous conditions in the common area. 
Plaintiff has failed to establish that City Market, Inc. was aware of the allegedly 
dangerous conditions for a sufficient time to have taken measures to correct the 
problem. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
City Market Inc. had no duty to protect plaintiff from an allegedly dangerous condition 
located on property it did not own or have a right to possess. 
Without sufficient evidence to establish actual or constructive knowledge of the 
allegedly dangerous condition in the common area on the part of City Market, Inc., 
plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of her burden of proof of negligence. 
Without sufficient evidence to establish that City Market, Inc. was aware of the 
allegedly dangerous condition in the common area on the part of City Market, Inc. for a 
sufficient time to have taken measures to correct the problem, plaintiff has failed to 
establish an essential element of her burden of proof of negligence. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant City Market, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment 
is granted. All claims against defendant City Market, Inc. are dismissed with prejudice. There being no 
just reason for delay, this Order is final as to defendant City Market, Inc. 
DATED this J ^ J ^ a y of X V / ^ ^ 7 2 0 0 4 . 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE BRUCE K. HALLID 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE 
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ADDENDA "H: 
DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF 
PAGES 134-137 
HEVELONE v. CITY MARKET, INC. 
February 1 7, 2004 PATTY LINN HEVELONE 
1 Q. Why did you think it was important to tell 
2 me about those people. 
3 A. Well, because you asked me what took 
4 place — 
5 Q. Sure. 
6 A. — and so I started with parking my car and 
7 going in. And just — you asked me what I remember, 
8 and those — little man and old lady in her thing were 
9 right there, so I went around them. That's something 
10 I can remember. 
11 Q. Okay. Had you ever parked in that location 
12 before in going into that store? 
13 A. Yeah, and in handicapped parking and — 
14 I've parked all over. 
15 Q. Had you ever parked specifically in that 
16 area, though? 
17 A. I would probably have to say yes. 
18 Q. Okay. And you've entered and exited the 
19 store similarly to the way you did it that evening? 
20 A. Well, I exit out just depending on which 
21 way the car is. 
22 Q. Sure, but I'm saying on the times where you 
23 parked in the same location that you parked that 
24 night, would your entrance and exit from the store 
25 have been pretty much the same path? 
Page 133 
1 A. Well, again, just depending on where I was 
2 parking. Like, if I was parked over here — 
3 Q. No, I'm saying if you were parked in the 
4 same place. 
5 A. Oh, in the same spot. Yes. 
6 Q. And had you ever noticed the hole that you 
7 fell in before this night? Had you ever seen it there 
8 before? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Ever stepped into it before? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Do you have any estimate how long it had 
13 been there before the night of the accident? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Okay. Did you ever receive any indication 
16 from the employees at City Market that you spoke with 
17 that they knew about the hole? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. What did they say to you? 
20 A. Sonny said that a few people had gotten 
21 hurt from the hole. 
22 Q. From that same hole? 
23 A. Um-hum. 
24 Q. Okay. Did he tell you names or specifics? 
25 A. No. They put the stop sign over the hole 
Page 134 
1 so people wouldn't fall anymore. 
2 Q. So after your accident, they put a stop 
3 sign in the hole? 
4 A. Um-hum, a long stick with a big ring. 
5 Q. With a base that basically fills the hole? 
6 A. It's like a tire rim, and a stop sign goes 
7 in it. 
8 Q. Is that what we're seeing in those pictures 
9 that counsel showed you? There's a metal ring in one 
10 of the holes. 
11 A. Well, there was the manhole. 
12 Q. No, there was the manhole, but there was 
13 also a metal ring next to it. He'll grab it. Just 
14 one second. 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: If I can find them again. 
16 Q. (By Mr. Linton) Is that what you're 
17 talking about? 
18 A. Yep, that's what I'm talking about. 
19 Q. Is that a picture of the hole you fell in, 
20 then? 
21 A. Let me see it one more time. 
22 I believe it is because I had noticed, when 
23 we went down to get the check, that he had suddenly 
24 put a sign there. 
25 Q. Put the stop sign there. 
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1 So were those pictures - there are two 
2 listed at the bottom, one with you and your tennis 
3 shoe standing in the hole and then one with the thing 
4 as you said, like a tire rim in the hole. Is that the 
5 same hole? 
6 A. I would — I don't know. I can't remember. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. I really can't remember if — if ~ all — 
9 I can't remember if we moved that to get — no, the 
10 picture wasn't covered yet — the hole wasn't covered 
11 yet. 
12 Q. So that sign that we're talking about was 
13 in a different location there? 
14 A. I t was up a ways. I t was right in the 
15 middle between the manhole and that hole. 
16 But, anyway, Sonny did say that they put it 
17 over the hole so nobody would fall in it. 
18 Q. So you're saying that they moved the 
19 location of that stop sign from where it was in the 
20 picture into the hole where you stepped - where the 
21 cart went into? 
22 A. That's what Sonny said, yes. 
23 Q. And he told you that other people fell 
24 because of that same hole? 
25 A. Yes, yep. 
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34 (Pages 133 to 136) 
GARCIA & LOVE 
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HEVELONE v. CITY MARKET, INC. 
February 17, 2004 PATTY LINN HEVELONE 
1 Q. Do you know how many people? 
2 A. No. He didn't say how many, he just said 
3 he had people that had fallen in that hole too. 
4 Q. And that was in the first conversation you 
5 had with Sonny? 
6 A. The second one, when I saw that they had 
7 covered it up with a stop sign. 
8 Q. So you saw they covered it up with a stop 
9 sign. You called them and said, Hey, what's the deal, 
10 that he explained that they -
11 A. No. I t was when I went in and got the 
12 check to pay my medical bill. 
13 Q. So is that - as you were entering 
14 you noticed they put the stop sign in the hole, and 
15 you asked him about it 
16 A. Um-hum. 
17 Q. And he told you that other people had 
18 fallen? 
19 A. Yeah, they'd fallen in the hole as well . 
20 Q. Did they fall before or after you? 
21 A. I didn't ask him that. He just said it. 
22 Q. Okay. Based on your judgment, are there 
23 any other factors that could have added to your knee 
24 condition and your knee pain and your arthritis that I 
25 think was mentioned as well? 
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1 A. What do you mean? 
2 Q. For example, you said that you were 
3 overweight before you had your gastric bypass. Do you 
4 think that could have been a factor that would have 
5 worn on your knee over time? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. You don't think your weight could have 
8 caused your knee to be in a certain condition? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Are there any other factors in your life 
11 that could have affected your knee at any time? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Okay. And I understand that you weren't, 
14 as I said, overweight at the time of the accident, but 
15 you don't believe that the history of having that 
16 problem could have affected your knee? 
17 A. No, because if it had, I wouldn't have beenl 
18 able to do all the jobs I had done over the years. 
19 Q. Okay. You testified that you didn't see 
20 the hole before the cart went into it, right? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. Were you looking for a hole in the parking 
23 lot? 
24 A. (No audible response.) 
25 Q. Not something you were paying attention to? 
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1 A. (No audible response.) 
2 Q. That's a no? 
3 A. The shopping cart, the way it goes like 
4 this, the boy stacked all the pop closest to the end. 
5 Q. Uh-huh. 
6 A. So it was like the pop was right here. I'd 
7 have to go like that to push my cart. I wasn't 
8 looking for a hole, I was just pushing my cart. 
9 Q. Was it dark by the time you left the store? 
10 A. I t was getting dark, yes. 
11 Q. So it still wasn't dark yet? 
12 A. No. I t was dusk. 
13 Q. Had the lights turned on yet in the parking 
14 lot? 
15 A. I don't believe — well, hum. I want to 
16 say yes. 
17 Q. But you're not sure? 
18 A. I'd have to go look through, but I think 
19 they were. 
20 Q. Okay. Judging by the hole when you went 
21 back to see it the other times and by what happened 
22 that evening, do you think, if you would have been 
23 looking for it, that you would have seen it? 
24 A. I f I hadn't had a shopping cart full of 
25 groceries and I was walking out, I'm sure I would have 
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1 seen it from the distance. 
2 Q. Uh-huh. 
3 A. But with the cart full of food and pop 
4 stacked up as high as it was, you couldn't see it 
5 coming. 
6 Q. Well, I know that you didn't see it coming, 
7 but if you - judging by how it looked after you saw 
8 it and after you knew about it, do you think, if you 
9 would have been looking for it, if you would have been 
10 looking ahead of yourself, that you would have seen 
11 it? 
12 A. Are you asking me would I have noticed it 
13 if I hadn't had a shopping cart? 
14 Q. No. I'm asking with the shopping cart that 
15 night, if you would have been specifically looking out 
16 ahead of the shopping cart, trying to notice where you 
17 were heading, do you think it's a big enough hole, 
18 it's a sizable location, that you would have been able 
19 to see it? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. And what's your reason for saying that? 
22 A. Because if I'm taking the shopping cart, I 
23 have food in it, even — even if it wasn't stacked up 
24 pop, okay, grocery sacks, paper grocery stacks sit at 
25 least this high. Here's the cart. Here's the bag. 
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